Police Reforms in India: Addressing Accountability and Efficiency

India’s police force governs over 1.4 billion people – yet it still operates under a law drafted in 1861, designed not to serve citizens but to suppress them. The Police Act of 1861 was enacted by the British in the wake of the 1857 uprising, with the explicit goal of maintaining colonial control. More than 75 years after independence, most Indian states continue to rely on this very legislation. The result is a policing system often criticised for political subservience, weak accountability, and a deeply strained relationship with the communities it serves. Understanding police reforms in India – why they are needed, what the courts have mandated, what stands in the way, and how communities can be part of the solution – is essential to any discussion of democratic governance.

Understanding the need for police reforms 🔗

Police reforms are not merely an administrative concern – they are a democratic necessity. A police force that operates without accountability erodes public trust, undermines the rule of law, and disproportionately harms the most vulnerable sections of society. In India, this erosion has been both structural and cultural.

The Police Act of 1861, which remains the foundational law for policing in most states, was criticised for its colonial framework that enforces a hierarchical and authoritarian structure conflicting with democratic values. It positions police as an arm of governing authority rather than a service for the community. Critically, it does not address citizens’ rights, grievance redressal, or any meaningful accountability mechanisms. As a Drishti IAS analysis notes, the Act placed more emphasis on control and coercion than on community involvement and crime prevention.

Several states – Maharashtra, Gujarat, Kerala, and Delhi among them – have enacted their own Police Acts, but even these are modelled closely on the 1861 law. Meanwhile, new criminal procedure laws introduced in 2024, such as the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, replaced the colonial Code of Criminal Procedure – yet the Police Act of 1861 continues to remain in force. This legislative inertia has produced persistent problems: political meddling, misuse of authority, insufficient transparency, and diminished public confidence.

The National Police Commission (NPC), formed in 1977, was the first major attempt to address these concerns comprehensively. It produced eight reports and even drafted a Model Police Act. But successive governments implemented only peripheral recommendations and ignored the core ones relating to accountability and autonomy. Further committees – the Ribeiro Committee (1998), the Padmanabhaiah Committee (2000), and the Malimath Committee (2002-03) – produced overlapping recommendations that similarly gathered dust.

Key directives from the Supreme Court: the Prakash Singh case 🔗

It took a retired police officer’s persistence to force the hand of the judiciary. Prakash Singh, a former Director General of Police who had served in Uttar Pradesh, Assam, and the Border Security Force, filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the Supreme Court in 1996. His petition sought structural changes to insulate the police from political control – particularly on matters of transfers and postings. The Supreme Court finally delivered its landmark judgment on September 22, 2006.

The ruling in Prakash Singh & Ors v. Union of India issued seven binding directives that all states and Union Territories were required to implement. These were not suggestions – they were court orders. The key mandates were:

State Security Commissions 🔗

Each state was directed to establish a State Security Commission (SSC) to advise the government on broad policy guidelines, set policing goals, and evaluate the performance of the state police. The SSC acts as a buffer between the political executive and the operational police, ensuring that governments cannot direct policing for partisan purposes.

Fixed tenure for senior officers 🔗

One of the most significant directives addressed the rampant practice of politically motivated transfers. The Court ordered that the Director General of Police (DGP) be selected from among the three senior-most officers empanelled by the UPSC, and then be given a minimum tenure of two years irrespective of the retirement date. Similarly, a two-year minimum tenure was prescribed for officers on operational duties – including Inspectors General and Superintendents of Police – to prevent mid-term transfers as a tool of political reward or punishment.

Police Establishment Boards 🔗

Police Establishment Boards (PEBs) – comprising police officers and senior bureaucrats – were mandated to decide on postings, transfers, promotions, and other service matters for officers below the rank of DGP. This was designed to shield routine personnel decisions from political interference.

Separation of investigation and law & order functions 🔗

The Court directed a gradual separation of the investigative police from the law and order police, beginning in towns with populations of one million or more. The intent was to encourage specialisation: dedicated investigators could focus on building cases without being pulled away for crowd management duties, and vice versa. This separation was seen as key to improving both the quality of investigations and public safety outcomes.

Police Complaints Authorities 🔗

Perhaps the most accountability-focused directive was the establishment of Police Complaints Authorities (PCAs) at both the state and district levels. As the original Supreme Court judgment specified, the district-level authority was to handle complaints against officers up to the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, while the state-level body would address complaints against Superintendents of Police and above. District authorities were to be headed by retired District Judges; state-level authorities by retired High Court or Supreme Court judges. These bodies were to be independent of both the government and the police hierarchy.

National Security Commission 🔗

At the central level, a National Security Commission was directed to be established to oversee the selection and placement of chiefs of Central Police Organisations, again with guaranteed minimum tenures of two years.

The Sorabjee Committee’s Model Police Bill, 2006 – submitted shortly after the judgment – provided the legislative framework through which these directives could be implemented most effectively. The Model Police Act was designed, as the Soli Sorabjee Committee articulated, to enable police “to operate as an efficient, effective, people-friendly, and responsive agency.”

Challenges in implementing reforms 🔗

The Prakash Singh judgment is now nearly two decades old. The compliance record is damning. According to the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI), not a single state has fully complied with the Supreme Court’s directives. While 18 states passed or amended their Police Acts after 2006, none of them entirely matched the legislative models the Court had envisaged. Five contempt petitions were issued against non-compliant states. Yet the situation on the ground has changed little.

Political interference as the root obstacle 🔗

The core problem is structural: politicians benefit from controlling the police. Section 3 of the 1861 Police Act vests “superintendence” of the police in the state government – but the scope of that superintendence is left undefined. This deliberately vague language creates space for patronage and partisan interference. Transfers are used to punish officers who act independently and reward those who comply. Research and survey data confirm this: studies by the Police Foundation India found that political interference was reported as the biggest factor adversely impacting crime investigation, with roughly three in every ten police officers flagging it as a concern.

States such as Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh – among the largest and most politically significant – have been the most resistant to meaningful compliance. Even where new Police Acts were passed, they were formulated in ways that, as observers have noted, “gave legal garb to the status quo.” The Maharashtra Police (Amendment and Continuance) Act, 2014, for instance, was meant to incorporate the Prakash Singh reforms but continued to face allegations of political meddling in transfers.

Organisational culture and internal resistance 🔗

Reform resistance is not only political – it is also internal. Senior officers who rose through a system built on hierarchical compliance may be reluctant to support structures that reward merit and accountability instead. Constables accustomed to receiving orders from political bosses – and shielded from citizen accountability – face an entire cultural overhaul if reforms are implemented in full. Research by the Police Foundation India notes that those closest to the top of the hierarchy may fear losing influence in a reformed, merit-based system.

Resource limitations and structural understaffing 🔗

The Indian police force is severely understaffed and under-resourced. Data from 2020 shows that 257 police stations had no vehicles, and 638 had no telephones – basic infrastructure gaps that undermine any reform initiative. Women represent only around 12% of the police force, far below the 33% target, restricting the force’s ability to handle gender-sensitive cases. Officer fatigue is another systemic problem: 14-hour workdays are common, leading to burnout that affects judgment and professionalism. Officers are regularly diverted to VIP protection and bandobast duties, further reducing capacity for community and investigative work.

The role of civil society 🔗

Amid institutional inertia, civil society organisations have become crucial watchdogs. Groups like the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) have tracked state-by-state compliance, published detailed reports, and submitted findings to the Supreme Court’s Monitoring Committee. Their work helped prompt show-cause notices to four states – Karnataka, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal – after the Justice Thomas Committee found persistent non-compliance. Without this external pressure, even the limited progress achieved would likely not have materialised.

Community involvement in policing 🔗

Police reform cannot succeed as a top-down administrative exercise alone. Sustainable change requires citizens to be active participants – not just beneficiaries – of a reformed policing system. This is the foundational premise of community policing, which the Supreme Court itself described in the Prakash Singh case as “a partnership between the police and the community they serve.”

Origins and evolution of community policing in India 🔗

Community policing in India has roots in traditional village watchmen and chowkidars, but its modern, formalised form emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s. According to research published in SAGE Journals, community policing in India initially evolved as a response to communal violence in Bhiwandi and Mumbai, where civil society-initiated Mohalla Committees helped restore communal harmony by creating regular interaction between different communities and police at the neighbourhood level. After the 1992-93 riots in Mumbai, these committees were institutionalised at the Beat and police station levels, tackling local disputes before they could escalate.

In 1994, the Ministry of Home Affairs formally launched a Community Policing Scheme, aimed at encouraging police to work collaboratively with communities to identify and resolve problems of crime and disorder. The scheme envisaged community policing units at the police station level. Over time, various state models emerged: Gram Rakshak Dal in Gujarat and Maharashtra, the Bastariya Battalion in Chhattisgarh which recruits tribal youth in Maoist-affected areas, the Village Defence Parties (VDP) in Meghalaya, and Manipur’s ‘Meira Paibis’ – a women’s patrol team that evolved into a smart policing structure with legal interception units and CCTV systems. Women-oriented community policing models, such as Mahila Commandos and Police Didi programmes, have played an important role in addressing crimes against women.

Public participation in drafting and oversight 🔗

Meaningful reform requires communities to be involved not just in policing practice, but in shaping policing policy itself. The Model Police Act, 2006, explicitly requires state Police Complaints Authorities to include a civil society member – ensuring that civilian voices are embedded in oversight structures, not merely consulted. Similarly, the Police Act Drafting Committee (PADC) that produced the Model Police Bill consulted multiple stakeholders before submission.

Public hearings and open consultation processes during police legislation drafting allow communities to communicate their specific safety needs – concerns that differ significantly between urban slums, tribal regions, and metropolitan areas. The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative has consistently advocated for community forums at the police station level – liaison bodies that promote communication, improve service delivery, increase transparency, and strengthen local accountability. Internationally, countries like Canada have made community involvement in policing a legal requirement, with police committees established by law to promote good relations between residents and law enforcement.

Why community involvement matters for gender and governance 🔗

Community participation in policing has a direct bearing on how gender-based crimes are handled. Women’s trust in the police determines whether they report sexual violence, domestic abuse, or harassment. When women are involved in community oversight bodies and police station-level committees, it creates safer reporting environments and more gender-sensitive responses. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission noted that police-public relations are in an unsatisfactory state precisely because people – especially women and marginalised communities – view the police as unresponsive and politically biased. Community-oriented mechanisms are one of the most direct routes to changing that perception and the structural reality behind it.

The path forward 🔗

The gap between what the Supreme Court mandated in 2006 and what states have implemented reveals how deeply entrenched the politics of policing are in India. A genuine path forward requires several converging actions. Legislatively, the Police Act of 1861 must be replaced with a rights-based national law – one that reflects democratic values rather than imperial ones. Structurally, the Prakash Singh directives on tenure, Police Complaints Authorities, and State Security Commissions must be enforced with real consequences for non-compliance. Operationally, increased investment in training – particularly in human rights, soft skills, and community engagement – is non-negotiable. And institutionally, civil society must be given a formal, protected seat at the oversight table rather than functioning only as an external pressure group.

India’s police force serves a democratic republic. For it to function as one, the institutions designed to hold it accountable must be built – and the communities it serves must be empowered to participate in that accountability.

What do you think? If Police Complaints Authorities had genuine independence and citizen representation, how might that change the way ordinary people interact with law enforcement? And given how deeply political interference has stalled reform for nearly two decades, what realistic mechanisms could shift the incentive structure for state governments to comply?

References

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police_Act,_1861
2. https://saslawchambers.com/blog/the-police-act-of-1861-an-in-depth-analysis-of-its-origin-impact-and-modern-day-relevance-in-indian-policing
3. https://www.drishtiias.com/blog/police-reforms-and-accountability
4. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prakash_Singh
5. https://www.manoramayearbook.in/current-affairs/india/2022/01/25/what-is-prakash-singh-case-judgement.html
6. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1090328/
7. https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/aj/police/india/initiatives/seven_steps_to_police_reform.pdf
8. https://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/javeed-ahmad-india-police-service-reform-political-corruption-news-15261/
9. https://www.policefoundationindia.org/images/resources/pdf/Shruti_Lakhtakia_Monograph_.pdf
10. https://www.pmfias.com/police-reforms/
11. https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/
12. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0032258X251334720
13. https://ijirl.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/EMERGENCE-OF-COMMUNITY-POLICING-IN-INDIA-CHALLENGES-AND-PRACTICALITY.pdf
14. https://prsindia.org/policy/analytical-reports/police-reforms-india